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Blog|Articles|November 17, 2026

Why medical device tariffs would hurt the U.S. manufacturers they’re meant to help

Fact checked by: Todd Shryock
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Key Takeaways

  • US manufacturers already supply ~70% of domestic medtech demand, operate nationwide facilities, and lead globally in R&D and exports, weakening arguments that the sector has been “offshored.”
  • Import risk is heterogeneous; allied supply chains differ materially from adversary dependence, and China comprises <3% of US medtech market, arguing for differentiated national security policy.
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The Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation could bring new tariffs on imported medical devices and supplies. Targeted reserves, procurement preferences and a faster FDA pathway for switching to U.S. suppliers would do more to bring device manufacturing home.

The Commerce Department is considering whether imports of medical equipment, devices, protective equipment and medical supplies threaten national security under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Its investigation could ultimately lead to new tariffs or other restrictions on products ranging from syringes and infusion pumps to pacemakers and imaging equipment. America should make more of the medical devices Americans depend on. But imposing new tariffs on medical technology is the wrong way to bring that manufacturing home.

The impulse is understandable. But the case for broad medical device tariffs just doesn't hold up.

Medical technology is not an industry that the United States has abandoned. American-made technologies already supply roughly 70% of the domestic medtech market. The industry operates thousands of facilities across all 50 states and exports about $80 billion in products annually. The United States leads the world in medtech research and development and is the leading exporter of medical technology.

Not all imports are evidence of dangerous dependence. Much of the 30% of medical technology manufactured outside the country comes from allies and trading partners in North America and Europe. China, the most plausible adversary concern, accounts for less than 3% of the total American medtech market. National security policy should distinguish between a critical product for which America depends on a potential adversary and a device or component moving through an integrated supply chain with an ally.

Markets reward the cheapest device available today. They don't necessarily price in the strategic value of having the capacity to manufacture that device domestically tomorrow. The COVID-19 pandemic taught us what can happen when a crisis interrupts access to products we assumed would always be available. Domestic manufacturing capacity provides a measure of security that won't necessarily show up in the price of a syringe, catheter or medical monitor.

The U.S. government does have an interest in correcting this market indifference to where something is produced and what that means for national security. But there is a problem with using tariffs to accomplish that goal: Medical device manufacturers currently building products in America already depend on global supply chains. American-made medical devices often contain imported raw materials, specialized components and subassemblies. Tariffs on these inputs could raise the cost of making the finished device here. Medical device manufacturers cannot necessarily respond by simply switching suppliers, and likely would run up against regulatory hurdles.

For medical technology, that creates a paradox: a tariff policy intended to bring more production to the United States could instead make it more expensive to manufacture here.

There is a better way to address genuine vulnerabilities. Start by identifying what they actually are. Reliance on a geopolitical adversary for an essential medical product with few alternative suppliers may pose a real national security risk. Importing a medical device from a NATO ally under an existing trade agreement does not. Where a true vulnerability exists, targeted tools can address it without penalizing the entire sector: strategic reserves for critical single-source products, Defense Production Act designations and federal procurement preferences for domestically manufactured devices represent only a few focused alternatives.

A tariff that treats both products as carrying the same threat simply because both are classified as medical technology won’t improve security, but it will make the U.S. less competitive.

The goal is not fewer imports for the sake of fewer imports. It is a stronger, more resilient American medical technology industry, and that goal is best served by removing barriers, not adding them.

One of the most significant barriers is already embedded in federal regulation. FDA medical device approvals follow strict processes. Because FDA approvals are tied to specific components and suppliers, a domestic manufacturer that wants to substitute American inputs for foreign ones faces an entirely new validation and review process to do it. That friction makes onshoring more expensive at precisely the time we want it to be less so. Streamlining that review pathway would do more to accelerate domestic production than any tariff, and it would cost American patients nothing.

Broad medical technology tariffs are a tax on the patients who need those devices and on the manufacturers who build them here. The administration’s instinct is right: the United States should make more of the medical technology Americans depend on. The instrument is wrong. The way to get there is to make the United States a better place to build, not a more expensive one.

Monique Yohanan, MD, MPH, is director of the Center for Better Health at Independent Women.


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